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Introductory Remarks 
Social work education in Britain has undergone repeated and fundamental 
restructuring in the past decade.  In the early 1990s the professional qualification, the 
Certificate in Qualifying Social Work (CQSW), was replaced by the Diploma in 
Social Work (DipSW), a shift which required significant curriculum changes. Now 
social work education is undergoing another major change, with the DipSW being 
replaced by an undergraduate degree. However, despite changes to practice and 
academic training requirements, there are some constants, some requirements which 
do not alter.  One of these is the demand for social work students to demonstrate that 
they can ‘apply theory to practice’ as part of qualifying requirements.  This 
requirement, presented casually alongside a long list of further requirements, 
characteristically fails to grasp that understanding the relationship between theory and 
practice has long been a source of debate within social science.  In many respects, the 
recent debate in Britain (see Trevillion, 2000) continues, and draws upon, consistent 
themes in social theory over the relative merits or otherwise of positivist paradigms, 
with their underlying assumptions of a social world that can be revealed through the 
application of correct techniques. The early debates in social theory were structured 
by a widespread belief in the power of scientific and secular-philosophical knowledge 
to provide for the direction and improvement of natural and social life.  The 'age of 




informed by justice and representing the march of progress.  Though the optimism 
generally attributed to the Enlightenment was tempered by ambivalence on the part of 
some theorists, or rejected by others, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
dominated by philosophical and theoretical interventions  which, in general, supposed 
that knowledge could provide a foundation for political and social progress.  This 
supposition could only be held by assuming that the world could be conceived as an 
object, containing an underlying unity, progressing in a logical way, and peopled by 
subjects whose access to rational thought would liberate them collectively from the 
superstitions of pre-modern life.  The underlying mechanisms of historical progress, 
the necessary regularities in social life, were held to be available to discovery by the 
sciences and philosophies, so that such knowledge attained a key role in the 
achievement of social progress (Penna, et al, 1999).   
 Although the 'age of reason' was also characterised by profound ambivalence 
concerning the possibilities for rational progress, the social sciences displayed a deep 
belief in the possibilities of knowledge to understand the social world and therefore 
guide the development of rationally organised structures, institutions and 
interventions.  Thus the objective of knowledge-generation has been the establishment 
of a foundational knowledge, derived from the exclusive truth-producing capacity of 
science, that can inform social action.  Foundational principles have been based upon 
two important assumptions: that theory involved a distinction between mind and 
world, between the subject and object of knowledge, and that language functioned as 
a neutral medium for the mind to mirror or represent the world (Seidman 1994: 3).   
This historical intellectual legacy, together with a need for professional status 
dependent on a proper ‘knowledge-base’, drives demands that professional practice 




demand betrays a lack of understanding of what theory is and what it can do and, at 
best, leaves students confused, whilst at worst it leads to cruel or ineffective practices 
in agencies.  Here I outline the historical context that has led to a particular 
understanding of theory as a guide to action, point to some perils of its application in 
practice, and suggest a different method of dealing with theory on social work degree 
schemes. 
What is Theory? 
What we call 'theory' can be understood as a form of social action that gives direction 
and meaning to what we do.  To be human is to search for meaning, and all of us hold 
theories about how and why particular things happen or do not happen.  Some of these 
theories are little more than vague hypotheses about what will happen if we act in a 
certain way in a certain situation and what we might expect from others. But many of 
the theories we hold are more complex and express our understandings of, for 
example, how organisations work, of how people become offenders, or why the 
distribution of resources is as it is.  In this sense theories are generalisations about 
what exists in the world and how the components of that world fit together into 
patterns.  In this sense also theories are 'abstractions' in as much as they generalise 
across actual situations our expectations and suppositions about the reasons why 
certain patterns exist (O'Brien and Penna, 1998).  
 In the same way that we use theory in our everyday lives, we also draw upon 
various theories as part of the ways we act in the world, so understandings of the 
‘social’ dimension of social work are also built upon different theoretical foundations.  
As O'Brien and Penna (1998) point out, theories about the validity of data and 
research procedures, theories about what motivates individual behaviour, theories 




way, become embedded in social, economic and criminal justice policies developed, 
implemented and managed by different social groups.  Theories about the proper 
relationship between the individual and the state, men and women, homosexual and 
hererosexual, inform policy and practice frameworks so that both the frameworks that 
legally bound social work, as well as practice priorities and interventions, differ 
substantially from country to country.  Theory about social life is either used or 
promoted in particular policy and welfare frameworks in order to make them more 
‘effective' or 'appropriate', and is invariably embedded in the social programmes that 
ensue from them.  In this way theories make up the premises and assumptions that 
guide the formulation of particular policies and practices in the first place, as well as 
their later implementation.  Such premises are essentially theoretical: they are  
'imaginary' in the sense that the conditions they describe, the logics of action and the 
structures of provision on which they focus are not proven, definite realities. 
 This use of theory in the ways described above developed from the intellectual 
sea-change of the eighteenth century European Enlightenment.  Prior to the 
Enlightenment, social organisation was understood through theological worldviews, 
and government of the population justified largely according to divine right and 
religious edict: the Sovereign ruled over a subject population because he or she was 
divinely ordained to so. However, from the middle of the seventeenth century 
onwards a shift in intellectual thinking occurred which was to have major implications 
for the development of European societies. This historical period - The Enlightenment 
– marks a time when people start to be understood as self-creating, rather than as 
products of divine creation.  A philosophical shift, questioning theological 
understandings of the human world and establishing the legitimacy of scientific 




social organisation. The Enlightenment sees the establishment of new philosophical 
systems for understanding both the natural and human worlds and the development of 
rational responses to social problems.  The Enlightenment promises progress and 
represents a faith in science as a progressive force which can understand, and hence 
solve, problems in the natural and social worlds.  
 In this intellectual movement, new ways of thinking overlay those they were 
in the process of replacing, so that the cosmic transcendence of religious thought was 
replaced by the universalism of philosophy, and the methods and principles of the 
natural sciences.  It was assumed that a theory could be developed that would 
substitute for the truth of religion.  Eighteenth and nineteenth century social thought 
was focused, in the social sciences, on the search for one theory that could explain the 
social world and hence provide a guide to action - a theory that could be used in 
practice – famously captured by the term praxis.  However, as the twentieth century 
developed, this conception of theory came under increasing attack, and this attack is 
one which has many implications for the use of theory in social work education and 
practice. 
Some Problems With Theory 
Several events in Europe contributed to a questioning of the application of theory to 
practice.  The establishment of a communist society based upon the premises of 
Marxist theory was one such event.  As the mass exterminations, abuses of power and 
repressions of the communist state came to widespread notice, so did the rationales 
underlying them.  The communist leadership, following particular strands of Marxist 
theory, imposed upon populations conditions which, in theory, were necessary for the 
development of a communist society.  Those individuals who did not fit the 




considered ‘deviant’ and sent for ‘retraining’ in labour camps when they were not 
killed.  The endless compulsory ‘self-criticism’ that members of various Marxist 
groups carried out was aimed at making individual behaviour conform to the tenets of 
theory.  Yet when many thousands of individuals failed to conform, it was their 
behaviour that came under scrutiny, rather than the premises and assumptions of the 
theory, resulting in tragedy for thousands.  The second tragedy was the application of 
theory to practice by Germany’s Nazi leadership.  These two examples provide 
perhaps the most extreme illustrations of the application of theory to practice, but the 
history of social welfare is littered with more mundane examples that nevertheless 
cause great misery to those subject to theory application.  We have seen the eugenics 
movement in the early twentieth century whose influence contributed to the 
institutionalisation (and worse) of people with learning difficulties, the widespread 
use in the mid-twentieth century of lobotomies in treating people with mental health 
problems and, to take two examples from this author’s practice career, the use of 
psychodynamic and behaviour modification theory in practice.   
I observed the use of psychodynamic theory in practice in the social work 
department of an acute unit in a psychiatric hospital.  A senior social worker 
specialised in dealing with depressed female lone-parents.  Reading through dozens of 
case-notes (meant to aid my practice) I was struck by the way that these women’s 
depression was attributed to various failures in their early psycho-sexual 
development, whilst their practical circumstances – victims of domestic violence, 
poor housing, lack of money – were completely ignored.  Needless to say, these 
women failed to improve, but the point to note here is that this failure was not 
attributed to the faulty premises of the theory and the way in which it was being 




from two years in a residential home for children with learning disabilities.  Here a 
behaviour modification regime was implemented by management with no critical 
appreciation of debates in psychology about what it means to be human, what 
motivates behaviour and how behaviour should be understood.  Those children who 
did not respond to ‘positive reinforcement’ (the majority) were labelled and punished, 
whilst the underlying problems of the theory itself left unexamined.  In short, in both 
these cases, where service-users failed to fulfil predicted outcomes derived from 
particular theoretical paradigms, the response displayed a notably similar 
chatacteristic as in the examples from totaliterian societies – the users were 
pathologised, rather than theoretical premises examined. 
An objection could be made here that these examples merely demonstrate a-
typical historical circumstances or incompetent practitioners.  However, whether at 
the level of whole societies, whole social groups, or numerous disparate individuals, a 
backlash against the conjoining of knowledge and power has been manifest in many 
locations, including: the overthrow of communism in the Soviet Union, the critical 
interrogation of ‘totalising’ discourses, the decline in membership of organised, 
hierarchical political movements, the widespread development of ‘rights-based ’ and 
user movements, and a suspicion of ‘expert’ practice and bureaucracies.  In social 
theory, the last three decades or so has seen a particularly sustained interrogation of 
the status of Enlightenment theory.  Under the impact of post-structuralism, 
particularly that associated with Foucault and Derrida , an unpackaging of the 
assumptions and premises of theory construction has severely undermined the ‘theory 
as truth and guide to practice’ position.  This is not to say such challenges to 
Enlightenment theory did not exist before, for a long tradition of hermeneutic and 




action.  Post-structuralism, however, has mounted a comprehensive and thorough 
critique of the epistemological basis of structuralism and realism.  In the current 
examination of Enlightenment thought, Derrida   'deconstructed' major traditions in 
western social thought, showing how accounts of human knowledge depended on the 
use of key textual devices for obscuring problematic philosophical categories, or for 
revealing and endorsing particular interpretations and meanings of social and political 
progress.  The construction of any text lends itself to several meanings and 
interpretations, such that it is impossible to arrive at any one fixed, ‘true’ account.  
Foucault, on the other hand, examined the epistemology underpinning the 
Enlightenment belief in the replacement of an institutionalised theological belief 
system with one which emphasised Reason and the limitless capacity of human 
knowledge.  Enlightenment philosophy suggests that what occurs in the world is 
subject to entirely knowable and explainable laws that can be discovered and used in 
the progress of human society and human mastery over the natural and social world.  
Foucault’s contribution to the unpicking of this position was to show, through 
examinations of historical understandings of punishment and sexuality, that there are 
other ways of understanding this history which suggest a very different interpretation 
of the Enlightenment and its effects on social life, and demonstrate that many truths 
and experiences of social life co-exist that make it impossible to provide an 
overarching account that explains everything.  At the same time, science constantly 
shifts its parameters, so that what may be ‘true’ at one historical moment is rendered 
false later.  
This brief outline cannot do justice to the sophistication and breadth of the 
critique of Enlightenment theory, critiques which have resulted in major debates over 




Lemert, 1999).  Even where the foundations of poststructuralist epistemology are 
rejected there is a much greater appreciation of the problems associated with 
universalism and linear structures, two of the major props of Enlightenment theory.  
The permeation of these critiques is perhaps most evident in mainstream emphases on 
‘difference’ and social constructivism, 'difference' and postmodernism, 
(c.f.,Briskman, 2001), and a general rejection in many disciplines of overarching, 
grand theory (Leonard, 1997).   
Here attention shifts to the assumptions embedded in theory and the way in 
which these assumptions become embedded in projects of nation-building, in legal 
and organisational structures, and in policy initiatives.  Goldberg’s (1993, 2002) work 
on ‘race’ and racialization traces this process of embedding through an examination of 
the ways in which Enlightenment thought depended upon a racialized subject of social 
action and object of social theory.  The pervasiveness of this discourse entrenches and 
normalizes symbolic representations and values both culturally and materially within 
the institutions of modern life (c.f., Goldberg, 1993: 8).  The social sciences are 
‘deeply implicated’ in the building of a racist culture and in the ‘hegemony of 
symbolic violence’ underpinning social systems (Goldberg, 1993: 12, 9).  Roediger 
(1994) examines a similar process in American history and nation-building, pointing 
to a normalization of ‘Whiteness’ in the construction of conceptual and political 
subjects.  This legacy enters social work in various ways (see Taylor, 1993), but 
appreciating the role of theory as cultural artefact, as a cultural product, produced in, 
and reproducing, social assumptions of normativity and relations of domination and 
subordination, can be similarly achieved in relation to gendered and sexualised 




  This leads us to a situation in which theory itself can be understood as a key 
resource in forging a ‘modern’ consciousness, and socio-political spheres shot 
through with asymmetries of power (Penna and O’Brien, 1996/7), where exploitation 
and oppression operate through complex and unstable socio-economic mechanisms 
(O’Brien and Penna, 1996).  Not only can the ‘social’ upon which we work not be 
known in its entirety, not be predicted, not be subject to fool-proof risk assessment, 
evaluation and so on, but theory production has arguably been a contributory 
mechanism in the creation of precisely many those socially problematic circumstances 
that social work sets out to address.  In short, Parton (2000:452) hits the nail on the 
head in claiming that we need to learn to live with ‘uncertainty, confusion and doubt’.  
Where then, does that leave theory in social work, if we accept this position?  I want 
to turn briefly, and finally, to some suggestions of the use of theory in social work 
education. 
Using Theory 
At the beginning of this piece I suggested that we all use theory in our everyday lives.  
Given that this is so, and that theory permeates every aspect of academic work, policy 
implementation and practice initiatives, even when it is tacit and unacknowledged, I 
would propose that social work students and, ultimately, service-users, would be 
better served if students were taught how theory-construction takes place and how to 
unpackage and critically examine theoretical edifices, accounts and the components 
through which they are constructed.  The task for social work students would be not 
the mechanistic injunction to ‘apply theory to practice’ but rather to consider how 
adequate the application of theory to practice might be in X or Y case. To do this, 
they would have to be taught not so much along  ‘who-says-what’ lines, but rather in 




constructed.  Theory building is an exercise in logic, moving from initial assumptions 
and premises to conclusions, through an argument linked by one or more claims.  
Taking these components apart can be taught as a skill (see, for example, Phelan and 
Reynolds, 1996; Thompson, 1996) rather than through the more philosophically 
based, social theory courses provided in many other disciplines.   Tackling theory in a 
skills-based way has several advantages: it demystifies theory and enables students to 
see that, with practice, they can take a theory apart and reconstruct it in much the 
same way as a plumber or mechanic might tackle a job; it leads to a critical scrutiny 
of practice proposals derived from (often unstated) theoretical premises and to 
confidence in rejecting the inappropriate; and, when the theory fails to deliver, it leads 
to critical scrutiny of the theory rather than the person on the receiving end of it.  This 
is not a plea for eclecticism, but for much more modest expectations of the theory-
practice relationship than are currently formally embedded in many social work 
training programmes.  I say ‘formally’ because many people have a suspicion of 
theory but, in my view, for the wrong reasons.  Most theories offer insights into the 
‘social’ sphere that is the ‘work’ of social workers but, ultimately, a theory is only as 
good as its critics.   
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